Care Coordination for Dually Eligible Beneficiaries by Dean, Katie M. & Grabowski, David C.
Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy 
Volume 8 
Issue 1 Health Care Reform, Transition and 
Transformation in Long-Term Care 
Article 5 
2014 
Care Coordination for Dually Eligible Beneficiaries 
Katie M. Dean 
Harvard Medical School, dean@hcp.med.harvard.edu 
David C. Grabowski 
Harvard Medical School, grabowski@hcp.med.harvard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katie M. Dean & David C. Grabowski, Care Coordination for Dually Eligible Beneficiaries, 8 St. Louis U. J. 
Health L. & Pol'y (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/jhlp/vol8/iss1/5 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Scholarship 
Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
35 
CARE COORDINATION FOR DUALLY ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 
KATIE M. DEAN AND DAVID C. GRABOWSKI 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Care coordination has been identified as a potential method of achieving 
the triple aim in health care—improving outcomes and care quality while 
reducing costs. Well-designed, targeted care coordination entails 
comprehensive coverage of services across a coordinated provider team 
working together to provide high-quality, patient-centered care. This model, 
however, faces significant challenges at both the payment and delivery levels. 
Health care payment is traditionally “silo-based,” with payers reimbursing 
individual providers for specific services without consideration of other 
services.1 The fee-for-service (FFS) model does not incent care coordination 
among providers and may even serve as a deterrent, because a reduction in 
utilization resulting from better and more coordinated care would mean a 
reduction in reimbursement for certain providers. The care coordination 
challenge extends to health care delivery, where again, coordination is 
discouraged as it typically requires costly infrastructure investments from 
providers with no promise of future savings or reimbursement from payers. 
The care coordination problem is quite evident in the fragmented care 
received by the sickest and frailest members of society, those who are dually 
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid (duals). This population is typically 
dealing with multiple chronic illnesses as well as functional limitations that 
require long-term care. Because of their health profiles, the duals tend to have 
multiple providers and require services that are covered by Medicare and 
Medicaid. 
Approximately 9,200,000 individuals in the United States are dually 
eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid coverage.2 They qualify for Medicaid 
due to their low income and assets. Roughly sixty percent are elderly duals 
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 1. Barbara Gage, Building a Long-Term Services and Supports Delivery System that Works, 
24 PUB. POL’Y & AGING REP. 56, 57 (2014). 
 2. KATHERINE YOUNG ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, PUB. 
NO. 7846-04, MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 1 (2013). 
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who meet the age requirement for Medicare, while the remaining forty percent 
of duals qualify for Medicare because of their Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) eligibility.3 The dual eligible population includes some of the 
sickest, frailest, and most vulnerable individuals covered by either program. 
Duals are more likely than other Medicare beneficiaries to have multiple 
chronic illnesses, functional limitations requiring assistance with activities of 
daily living (ADLs) and a significant mental illness (SMI) or substance use 
disorder (SUD). 
The duals comprise about twenty percent of Medicare beneficiaries and 
fifteen percent of Medicaid beneficiaries, yet they account for roughly thirty-
one percent of Medicare spending and thirty-nine percent of Medicaid 
spending annually.4 Medicare covers acute services for the duals, including 
hospital procedures, physician visits, prescription drugs, and post-acute care, 
while Medicaid covers Medicare premiums and cost-sharing and long-term 
care services.5 
Due to their poor health statuses, the duals use a range of health care 
services, which vary between the elderly and the young duals. Elderly duals 
are more likely than younger dual beneficiaries to utilize institutional long-
term care services and skilled nursing facilities for post-acute care. Young 
duals are more likely to use outpatient hospital services and physician services, 
and both groups are similarly likely to require inpatient hospitalizations.6 
Because the duals are likely to require assistance with ADLs or to suffer from 
an SMI or SUD, they are also far more likely to live in an institution, with 
seventeen percent of the dually eligible population currently institutionalized.7 
The high levels of service utilization among duals, combined with their 
tendency to receive care from multiple providers and the dual-payer 
reimbursement model, have contributed to an epidemic of poor care 
 
 3. Id. at 10. 
 4. GRETCHEN JACOBSON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. NO. 8138-02, MEDICARE’S 
ROLE FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 2 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfounda 
tion.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8138-02.pdf. 
 5. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE DIVERSITY OF DUAL ELIGIBLE 
BENEFICIARIES: AN EXAMINATION OF SERVICES AND SPENDING FOR PEOPLE ELIGIBLE FOR 
BOTH MEDICAID AND MEDICARE 1 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.word 
press.com/2013/01/7895-02.pdf [hereinafter DIVERSITY OF DUAL ELIGIBLES]. See also 
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: NEW APPROACHES IN 
MEDICARE 72 (2004). 
 6. See DIVERSITY OF DUAL ELIGIBLES, supra note 5, at 1, 4. 
 7. Dual Eligibles – Health Services Utilization, THE SCAN FOUNDATION (2011), 
http://www.thescanfoundation.org/sites/default/files/1pg_DataBrief_No10.pdf; Medicare 
Beneficiaries With Severe Mental Illness and Hospitalization Rates, THE SCAN FOUNDATION 
(2013), http://www.thescanfoundation.org/sites/thescanfoundation.org/files/1pgdatabrief_no36_ 
medicare_beneficiaries_with_severe_mental_illness_and_hospitalization_rates.pdf. 
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coordination, low-quality care and difficulty accessing appropriate care.8 
Medicare and Medicaid are both large public programs with frequently 
misaligned incentives that can discourage care coordination. One important 
result of the uncoordinated care experienced by most duals is a high rate of 
avoidable hospitalizations.9 Spector and colleagues identified sixty percent of 
hospitalizations among long-term nursing home residents as potentially 
avoidable.10 Similarly, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
found that forty-five percent of hospitalizations of Medicare beneficiaries for 
either short-stay or long-stay nursing home residents could have been 
avoided.11 Not only are these hospitalizations costly for Medicare, they are 
disruptive and potentially harmful for the elderly patients experiencing this 
type of unnecessary care. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the barriers to care coordination 
for dually eligible individuals. Care is currently fragmented at both the 
payment and the delivery level. Thus, a key takeaway from our article is that in 
order to introduce system-level coordination of care, policymakers need to 
reform both the payment and delivery of services for dually eligible 
individuals. Efforts to fix either the payment or delivery system in isolation 
will not lead to sustainable, comprehensive reform. 
We begin the paper by presenting two representative patient vignettes to 
illustrate the coordination of care problems faced by dually eligible 
beneficiaries. We then use these patient vignettes to discuss the implications of 
various care coordination issues for representative elderly and young duals. 
II.  PATIENT VIGNETTES 
The duals are a heterogeneous group along a number of dimensions, but in 
order to illustrate the consequences of poor care coordination, we consider a 
scenario that could be experienced by a “representative” older dual living in a 
nursing home and a “representative” younger dual living in the community. 
 
 8. See generally TA Coughlin et al., Among Dual Eligibles, Identifying The Highest-Cost 
Individuals Could Help In Crafting More Targeted And Effective Responses, 31 HEALTH AFF. 
889, 1083 (2012). 
 9. MISHA SEGAL, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING,, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES AND POTENTIALLY AVOIDABLE HOSPITALIZATIONS 1, 2, 
6 (2011). See generally A. Wysocki et al., The Association between Long-Term Care Setting and 
Potentially Preventable Hospitalizations among Older Dual Eligibles, 49 HEALTH SERVS. 
RESEARCH 778 (2014). 
 10. William D. Spector et al., Potentially Avoidable Hospitalizations for Elderly Long-Stay 
Residents in Nursing Homes, 51 MED. CARE 673, 673 (2013). 
 11. Initiative to Reduce Avoidable Hospitalizations Among Nursing Facility Residents, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/rahnfr/ (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2014). 
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“Ms. B” is a ninety year-old woman living in a nursing home. She suffers 
from moderately advanced Alzheimer’s disease, congestive heart failure with 
severe left-ventricular dysfunction and chronic pain from degenerative joint 
disease. Under the traditional payment and delivery model, Ms. B has three ID 
cards—Medicare, prescription drugs, and Medicaid—and three different sets 
of benefits. She is treated by multiple providers who rarely communicate. 
Now imagine Ms. B develops a nonproductive cough and fever of 100.4°F. 
Although Ms. B’s symptoms are treatable in the nursing home, in a typical 
scenario she will be sent to the emergency room and likely admitted for an 
inpatient hospital stay. Why? Because under the current payment system, 
nursing homes are able to receive reimbursement from Medicaid for holding 
Ms. B’s bed while she undergoes treatment in the hospital, and then to receive 
reimbursement from Medicare when Ms. B returns to the nursing home for 
what is considered post-acute treatment after her hospital stay.12 Medicaid pays 
for the nursing home care but does not share in any Medicare savings 
associated with reduced hospitalizations. Nursing homes can invest in the 
infrastructure to safely prevent a hospitalization, but because they do not share 
in the savings from reduced hospitalizations, they are discouraged from 
making this investment. 
Ms. B is representative of an elderly dual; but the young duals, those under 
sixty-five who qualify for Medicare through SSDI eligibility, present different 
care coordination issues than their elderly counterparts. 
“Mr. C” is a forty-year-old dual with schizophrenia, an SUD, and multiple 
chronic illnesses. Mr. C resides in the community and receives assistance with 
finding and maintaining housing and employment, along with some 
community-based Medicaid case management. When Mr. C’s medication was 
changed to a generic formulation, his Medicare Part D prescription coverage 
required a prior authorization of the drug, resulting in a lapse in Mr. C’s access 
to medication. During this period, Mr. C had a psychiatric event and was 
brought to the emergency department for treatment. Because Medicaid does 
not cover Mr. C’s prescription drugs, his Medicaid case manager had no 
knowledge of the lapse in his treatment, and Mr. C had deteriorated enough as 
to be unable to relay the information. The case manager was only privy to the 
psychiatric symptoms of Mr. C’s medication disruption, and so she did not 
intervene when he was brought to the Emergency Department (ED) for acute 
treatment. However, once Mr. C entered the ED, Medicare took over coverage, 
and the Medicaid case manager did not follow Mr. C through his acute 
treatment and subsequent Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) assignment. 
Mr. C’s episode and adjustment to new medication were disorienting, so 
the hospital released him to a SNF for post-acute treatment. The Medicaid case 
 
 12. DAVID C. GRABOWSKI, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: CONFLICTING INCENTIVES FOR 
LONG-TERM CARE 10 (2007). 
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manager is typically not responsible for enrollees when an acute care episode 
results in hospitalization or entry into a SNF. This lack of coordination 
increases the likelihood that Mr. C will not return to the community following 
an acute care episode.13 
In both of these cases, the dually eligible individual is provided lower 
quality services in a higher cost setting because no incentive exists for care 
alignment among Medicare, Medicaid and the various providers. In this paper, 
we will provide an overview of the care coordination problem and suggest 
possible delivery and payment levels to improve care quality, improve health 
outcomes, and reduce the cost of care for dual eligibles such as Ms. B and 
Mr. C. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARE COORDINATION PROBLEM 
The poor coordination of Medicare and Medicaid financing and delivery of 
services has been a long-standing problem in the care of the dually eligible 
population.14 As suggested by the two patient vignettes, the fragmented 
coverage of acute and long-term care services often contributes to higher costs 
and worse patient outcomes. Given the bifurcated coverage introduced by 
Medicare and Medicaid, neither program has an incentive to internalize the 
risks and benefits of its actions as they pertain to the other program.15 Thus, 
each program has the narrow interest in limiting its share of costs, and neither 
program has an incentive to take responsibility for overall care management or 
quality of care. This fragmentation flows down to the providers in that long-
term care providers often lack the incentive to invest in the expertise and 
infrastructure to treat patients in place. The interrelationship between payment 
and delivery of care for the duals is represented in Exhibit One. Historically, 
we have had FFS payment and fragmented delivery of care, represented by the 
“status quo” in the lower left quadrant. 
 
 13. Id. at 12. 
 14. JENNIFER RYAN & NORA SUPER, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY FORUM, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 
794, DUALLY ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: TWO FOR ONE OR DOUBLE JEOPARDY? 
4, 11 (2003). 
 15. Grabowski, supra note 12, at 11. 
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EXHIBIT ONE: DELIVERY AND PAYMENT LEVEL REFORMS 
 Payment 
 
 Fee for Service            Global payment 
Delivery 
 
Coordinated 
 
 
Fragmented 
Telemedicine; 
Case management 
Integrated Care 
Demonstration 
Status quo Pay for Performance 
One common outcome of this “status quo” is the high rate of potentially 
avoidable hospitalizations for both elderly and young duals. In 2005, 
potentially avoidable hospitalizations of nursing home residents cost $1.9 
billion, with an avoidable hospitalization rate of 338 per 1000 person-years.16 
If Ms. B experiences a health issue, her nursing home does not have 
appropriate staffing or infrastructure to care for her in place, so she is sent to 
the hospital for treatment. Ms. B’s nursing home lacks the financial incentive 
to invest in the infrastructure necessary to care for its residents onsite, and so 
the ED is likely to remain the primary care setting for nursing home patients 
with a flare-up of a chronic condition and other non-life-threatening medical 
issues. Due to her age and frailty, Ms. B leaves the hospital disoriented and 
more vulnerable than she had been previously, directly increasing the 
likelihood that she will be re-hospitalized in the next thirty days. 
The hospitalization of the community-dwelling duals is also a significant 
issue. In 2005, potentially avoidable hospitalizations of Medicaid Home and 
Community-Based Services (HCBS) clients cost $463 million, with an 
avoidable hospitalization rate of 250 per 1000 person-years.17 Although Mr. C 
has a Medicaid case manager, some aspects of his care are still uncoordinated, 
so his case manager has no role in his medication change, hospitalization, or 
the decision to send him to a SNF for recovery. As with Ms. B, Mr. C finds his 
hospitalization disorienting and has arrived at the SNF in a weaker and more 
vulnerable state. 
Despite the differences in their patient profiles and living arrangements, 
Ms. B and Mr. C find themselves similarly susceptible to unnecessary, 
dangerous, and avoidable hospitalizations due to the fragmented state of their 
 
 16. Edith G. Walsh et al., Potentially Avoidable Hospitalizations of Dually Eligible 
Medicare and Medicaid Beneficiaries from Nursing Facility and Home-and Community-Based 
Services Waiver Programs, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. 821, 825-26 (2012). 
 17. Id. at 824, 825-27. 
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care. The FFS payment structure of reimbursement for care provided to duals 
encourages this type of health cycle, in which the health outcomes of patients 
diminish due to an inability to access proper care in both long-term care 
institutions and in the community. 
The experiences of Ms. B and Mr. C are representative of issues and 
outcomes of both elderly and young duals and make it clear that the current 
FFS model is not working for this population. Although attempts at integrated 
care for the dually eligible have so far failed to improve outcomes while 
reducing costs, several evidence-based delivery and payment innovations show 
promise toward achieving the triple aim. In the next two sections below, we 
discuss how we might better address care at the delivery level and then the 
payment level. We ultimately conclude that meaningful system-level change 
requires reforms at both the payment and delivery levels. 
IV.  DELIVERY REFORM ALONE IS NOT SUSTAINABLE 
The care coordination problems experienced by Ms. B and Mr. C can be 
broken down into failures at both the delivery and payment levels. A common 
delivery failure, and one experienced by Ms. B. above, is a failure of nursing 
homes and other providers to invest in infrastructure and expertise to treat 
residents safely in a nursing home setting. The preponderance of nursing 
homes lack the tools and staffing to treat ailments such as urinary tract 
infections and minor falls on-premises. The lack of onsite clinical expertise 
results in residents being sent to the hospital to receive expensive care in an 
unnecessarily acute setting.18 For example, during off-hours, if a resident 
becomes ill, the on-call physician has the option of going to the nursing home 
for a consultation or recommending that the resident be sent to the hospital for 
care; the latter of the two options is the most common. 
One potential way to mitigate the increasing rates of unnecessary 
hospitalizations of nursing home residents is through telehealth. Telehealth can 
include any type of health care service provided in a non-face-to-face setting, 
but it is most commonly used to refer to a teleconference taking the place of an 
in-person consultation.19 In the nursing home setting, a physician could 
videoconference with a resident and her family in real-time to potentially avoid 
a costly trip to the emergency room and possible hospital admission. 
Grabowski and O’Malley conducted a randomized study of telehealth in a 
 
 18. David C. Grabowski, Predictors of Nursing Home Hospitalization: A Review of the 
Literature, 65 MED. CARE. RES. & REV. 2, 4, 24 (2008). 
 19. What is Telemedicine? AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, http://www.americantelemed.org/ 
about-telemedicine/what-is-telemedicine#.VE5sii5dU00 (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
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Massachusetts nursing home chain.20 The nursing homes in the treatment 
group experienced fewer hospitalizations and generated roughly $100,000 in 
Medicare savings annually in prevented hospital transfers.21 The telehealth 
infrastructure cost $30,000 per nursing home annually.22 Although the study 
findings suggested that the hospital savings exceeded the costs of the 
technology, the nursing home chain did not fully implement the intervention 
because of the disconnect in the return on the investment. As long as Medicare 
reaps the savings of reduced hospitalizations while nursing homes foot the bill 
for new technologies, nursing homes will not pay for expensive infrastructure 
modifications despite potential improvements to resident health outcomes. 
Using the framework for Exhibit One (upper left quadrant), telemedicine 
addresses the fragmentation in delivery, but it is still based on the underlying 
FFS model. 
Another potential delivery-level intervention to alleviate the reliance on 
acute care is an integrated case manager. In the abovementioned scenario, Mr. 
C has a case manager who is paid for by Medicaid and, therefore, is not 
responsible for Mr. C’s Medicare-funded care. This fragmentation led to the 
case manager being unaware of Mr. C’s lapse in medication and to his being 
released from the hospital into a SNF rather than back into the community. 
Although Medicaid HCBS case management has the potential to generate 
positive outcomes for community-dwelling duals, these programs often 
introduce negative outcomes because of the broader disconnect with the 
Medicare program. For example, an evaluation of Florida HCBS programs 
found evidence of cost shifting to Medicare through increased inpatient 
hospital days for dually eligible enrollees.23 In the Florida programs, the 
Medicaid HCBS contractor is responsible for paying only the Medicare 
deductibles and copayments when a dually eligible enrollee is hospitalized, 
with Medicare paying the bulk of the hospital expenditures.24 If the dually 
eligible enrollee is not hospitalized, the HCBS contractor must pay the full cost 
of services, such as respite care. Thus, the contractor has the unintended 
incentive to shift costs to Medicare by hospitalizing clients. Once again, we 
have an example of a reform that offers a strong delivery intervention without 
any broader change or alignment in payment. 
 
 20. David C. Grabowski & A. James O’Malley, Use Of Telemedicine Can Reduce 
Hospitalizations Of Nursing Homes Residents And Generate Savings For Medicare, 33 HEALTH 
AFF. 244, 245 (2014). 
 21. Id. at 247. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Glenn Mitchell, II et al., The Relative Benefits and Costs of Medicaid Home-and 
Community-Based Services in Florida, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 483, 488 (2006). 
 24. Id. at 485. 
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V.  PAYMENT REFORM IS NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT 
Beyond delivery-level issues, elderly and non-elderly duals also experience 
care coordination failures at the payment level. The primary payment-level 
issues at play in covering the dually eligible population are the conflicting 
financial incentives between Medicare and Medicaid, two large-scale, public 
programs that were not designed to work together. In Ms. B’s case, her nursing 
home shifted costs to the federal government instead of developing the 
infrastructure and staffing to treat Ms. B on-premises. The nursing home was 
not incentivized to invest in improving its scope of care, because Medicaid 
would not reimburse it for the costly changes, and it would not receive a share 
of any potential cost savings from reduced hospitalizations, which would only 
go to Medicare. Similarly, Mr. C’s case management benefits only applied to 
his Medicaid-funded services, so when he was sent to the hospital, he received 
no guidance and was released to a SNF, a Medicare-funded treatment setting. 
Mr. C’s disruption in case management services and resulting release to a SNF 
greatly decreases the likelihood that Mr. C will ever return to living in the 
community. 
To improve the quality of care and address the payment-based issues 
hindering quality improvements in nursing homes, CMS initiated the Nursing 
Home Value-Based Payment Demonstration (NHVBP) in July of 2009.25 The 
voluntary program ran from 2009 through 2012 and included thirty-eight 
nursing homes in Arizona, seventy-two in New York and sixty-one in 
Wisconsin.26 The demonstration evaluated participating nursing homes using 
four performance domains: staffing, survey inspections, quality measures and 
hospitalizations.27 Top-performing nursing homes were to receive a reward 
payment based on the cost savings they generated for Medicare. 
The demonstration resulted in little pre/post change in performance across 
the treatment and control nursing homes and mixed or negative results on 
savings.28 In Year One, both Arizona and Wisconsin achieved savings.29 In 
Year Two, only Wisconsin realized savings, and in Year Three, none of the 
states generated any Medicare cost savings.30 Qualitative interviews with 
nursing home leadership suggested that the facilities did not make major 
investments toward preventing hospitalizations in spite of the potential 
 
 25. LISA GREEN, L&M POLICY RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF THE NURSING HOME VALUE-
BASED PURCHASING DEMONSTRATION 1 (2013), available at http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/re 
ports/NursingHomeVBP_EvalReport.pdf. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Id. at 2. 
 30. Id. 
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financial rewards.31 The NHVBP results align with the broader economics 
literature suggesting financial incentives alone are not likely to succeed in the 
context of complicated tasks such as preventing hospitalizations. For example, 
education research on the use of financial incentives to encourage student 
performance has indicated that these incentives do increase student attendance, 
but they have had little impact on more complicated outcomes such as 
graduation rates or student achievement.32 We argue that payment reform is 
necessary but not sufficient to improve care quality and reduce costs. In 
Exhibit One (lower right quadrant), the NHVBP pay-for-performance offers a 
global payment but does not offer any reform to the delivery system. 
VI.  SYSTEM-LEVEL REFORM UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Based on the abovementioned delivery-level and payment-level 
approaches to improving care coordination for duals, it is clear that what is 
needed is an integrated program that combines reforms to the delivery and 
payment systems currently in place. Under the Affordable Care Act, twenty-six 
states received funding and approval to develop new models to coordinate care 
for duals.33 Variation exists across the states in the proposed models, but all 
include reforms at the payment and delivery levels (upper right quadrant in 
Exhibit One). 
On the delivery side, a number of states are considering using or 
developing state-specific service delivery infrastructure, such as the Tulsa 
Health Innovation Zone or the Wisconsin Family Care Program.34 Despite their 
unique attributes, the states can be categorized at a higher level by whether 
they propose to build on existing capitated managed care programs, expand 
FFS initiatives such as patient-centered medical homes and health homes, or 
do both. A range of accountable entities have been proposed, including health 
 
 31. Grabowski & O’Malley, supra note 20, at 248. 
 32. Robert E. Slavin, Can Financial Incentives Enhance Educational Outcomes? Evidence 
from International Experiments, 5 EDUC. RES. REV. 69, 78 (2010). 
 33. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2601, 124 Stat. 
314-5 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE 
UNINSURED, PUB. NO. 8369, STATE DEMONSTRATIONS TO INTEGRATE CARE AND ALIGN 
FINANCING FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES: A REVIEW OF THE 26 PROPOSALS SUBMITTED 
TO CMS 4 (2012) available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/83 
69.pdf; see also MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, 
FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ALIGNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE 
BENEFICIARIES COMPARED: STATES WITH MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING APPROVED BY 
CMS 1 (2014) (providing a state-by-state overview of state participation in demonstrations). 
 34. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATES UNITED FOR AGING & DISABILITIES, STATE MEDICAID 
INTEGRATION TRACKER 51, 66 (2014), [hereinafter TRACKER] available at http://nasuad.org/doc 
umentation/nasuad_materials/Medicaid%20Tracker/September%202013%20Integration%20 
Tracker.pdf. 
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plans, emerging accountable care organizations, regional provider 
collaboratives, and state agencies themselves, acting as managed care 
organizations. At least four states (California, Minnesota, New York, and 
Washington) expect to use different service delivery approaches in different 
parts of their states.35 
The states’ approaches to payment map their service delivery approaches, 
with the managed care states proposing capitated or global payments to 
accountable entities, and the other states proposing to introduce new incentives 
in a FFS payment context, such as measuring FFS reimbursement against 
global budgets with the opportunity for gain-sharing.36 
All of the states seek to restructure the federal-state relationship in regard 
to Medicare. Several have proposed to take Medicare financial risk by 
receiving a risk-adjusted Medicare capitation from CMS and unifying 
Medicare and Medicaid at the state level.37 Others have proposed gain-sharing 
arrangements with CMS without taking on the full Medicare financial 
downside risk.38 States are also pushing the policy envelope on Medicare 
enrollment policy.39 At least one state (Oregon) has proposed mandatory 
enrollment for all dually eligible beneficiaries.40 Several others propose 
passive enrollment with the ability to opt out.41 
Most of the states are seeking to fully integrate all Medicare and Medicaid 
services, including prescription drugs, long-term services and supports, and 
behavioral health services, but some important exceptions will challenge the 
notion of fully integrated care. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Oregon, and 
Tennessee are all proposing that one or more key service area (e.g., long-term 
services and supports, behavioral health, Part D) will be coordinated with but 
remain separate from their Medicare-Medicaid initiative, at least initially.42 
Most of the states propose large, statewide initiatives for all full-benefit 
dually eligible beneficiaries, but a few are targeting subsets, including 
 
 35. Id. at 7, 23, 32, 45. 
 36. Id. at 23, 25. 
 37. Ellen Breslin et al., Risky Business: Capitated Financing in the Dual Eligible 
Demonstration Projects, COMMUNITY CATALYST 1, 6 (2013), http://www.communitycatalyst. 
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Connecticut, which proposes to begin with older persons; Massachusetts, 
which is targeting adults under sixty-five years; and South Carolina, which is 
focusing on persons with behavioral health needs.43 
Despite all the variation in design features, the states have many goals in 
common. Most states, for example, want to decrease utilization of preventable 
hospital, nursing home and other high-cost services, and nearly all states have 
articulated goals concerning unification or streamlining of the administrative 
processing of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The health and long-term care of the dually eligible population historically 
have been characterized by high spending and low quality. A major 
explanation for this inefficiency has been the lack of care coordination in the 
payment and delivery of health and long-term care services. As we argued 
above, in order to ensure meaningful system change, we need to coordinate 
services at both the payment and the delivery level. In returning to the patient 
vignettes, imagine Ms. B and Mr. C under an integrated care program that 
coordinates both the payment and delivery of services. Both beneficiaries 
would have one insurance card, comprehensive benefits, a coordinated 
provider team with a dedicated case manager, and a comprehensive, 
individualized care plan. Most importantly, all of the decisions about their 
health care and treatment would be made with their needs and preferences in 
mind. This type of care is achievable for all dually eligible individuals but only 
with comprehensive reform that addresses the fragmented payment and 
delivery models currently present in our system. Moving forward, it will be 
important to track spending and outcomes under the integrated care 
demonstration and other similar initiatives designed to reform the payment and 
delivery system for dually eligible individuals. 
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